Russia, NATO Expansion, and Ukraine
The two primary schools of thought and what they say about the Ukrainian conflict.
Realism
The realists say that great powers not only demand spheres of influence but also have the military and economic capabilities to obtain and secure them. From this perspective, it is unsurprising that countries such as Russia and China resent an American presence so close to their borders, whether in the Baltics or Taiwan. And it should also be unsurprising for the United States to be sensitive to unfavorable military developments in the Western Hemisphere, whether in Cuba, Nicaragua, or Venezuela. The realist school of thought defines great powers as capable military and economic states with a set of basic security aims, including a sphere of influence.
Liberal Internationalism
Liberal internationalists, only the other hand, view international politics as a competition between democratic, liberal states and authoritarian states. Progress in domestic politics is associated with democracy, liberalism, and capitalism, and success in domestic politics means peace with liberal-minded neighbors and friction with authoritarian-minded countries. From this perspective, great powers are defined by significant military and economic power, but their behavior in the international system—whether aggressive or defensive—is largely dependent on their domestic political system.
Applying Theory to Ukraine
Ukraine may be the place where the assumptions of these two groups (realists and liberal internationalists) and their predictions can be best observed.
John J. Mearsheimer, a prominent realist, argues that NATO’s 2008 declaration to bring Ukraine and Georgia into the military alliance encouraged the Georgians to play "hardball with the Russians, which triggered the Russian invasion of Georgia a few months later. He explains the Ukraine crisis has followed a similar pattern: following the Western-supported Maidan protests, Russia seized Crimea and supported rebels in Eastern Ukraine. This timeline, according to Mearsheimer, clearly shows that it was the West that caused the unfortunate chain of events, not Russia. Because the West did not believe Russia deserved either a sphere of influence or a security guarantee, it continued its policy of EU and NATO expansion and reaped the consequences.
On the other hand, liberal internationalists argue that Russian President Vladimir Putin is not only opposed to democracy and liberalism in his own country but also in his neighbors and throughout the globe. He does not want Ukraine to adopt Western values and behaviors and will use force to prevent it. He would prefer Russia decide Ukraine’s political, economic, and security orientations rather than Ukraine. Naturally, his aims must be countered by a coalition of democratic and freedom-minded countries— NATO, led by the United States.
Russia and a Sphere of Influence
One of the West’s most successful strategies is creating international political and economic unions (liberal internationalism!), which is followed by strong military ties. This is the playbook when it comes to NATO membership. Russia obviously cannot obtain—much less maintain—a similar sphere of influence. This is the case not only in Eastern Europe, but in the Caucasus and Central Asia. This is why NATO and the EU have expanded eastward, why Turkey and Azerbaijan came out successful in Nagorno-Karabakh, and why China is quietly challenging Russia’s economic and military domination of Central Asia. Geopolitical analyst Bruno Macaes noted:
While this is certainly true generally, it is not the case in Ukraine, especially Eastern Ukraine. Russia’ interest in Ukraine is vital enough that it can maintain great military and economic influence there. As Macaes points out in another article, Russia can easily create chaos in Ukraine to paralyze the country, as it is doing now through its military buildup. The crisis over Ukraine’s fate mirrors a crisis over that of Russia: can either country reach a mutually acceptable accommodation with an EU- and NATO-dominated Europe? Or, phrased somewhat differently, can an EU- and NATO-dominated Europe accept limits on expansion?
Image obtained at The New York Times via the Associated Press: Russian troops near Ukraine.
How do you think the Thucydides Trap is playing out so far?